Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom

 

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Admissibility of Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom

The rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence in courts are referred to as the Frye or Daubert standards. These stem from the Frye vs. the United States or the Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals cases. However, there are states that do not support or align to the given rules. Such states follow an alternative rule that was developed by the legislature and adopted by Congress in the year 1975, largely termed as the 702. This alternative rule states that “if scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise” (Calhoun, 2008, p.1).

The MarylandState does not conform to the Daubert standard. However, it sometimes adopts the Frye tests and uses it in some cases. For example, the Frye test was employed in Reed vs. State, Hutton vs. State and Burral vs. State in 1978, 1995 and 1999 respectively. In 2005 in a case concerning Smith vs. State, the Supreme Court in Maryland offered a statement that the State does not reject the Daubert standard but rather left a case-by-case development where it could be determined whether or to what extent the standard could be applied (Cranor, 2006).

In New Jersey, the Daubert standard has been adopted and is still applied even though there are incidences that it has not been fully utilized. In the 1995 case concerning Bahrle vs. Exxon Corp., the Daubert standard was cited in the ruling (Brennan et al., 2009). It was stated that experts must name the factual bases that lead to the conclusions, offer an explanation for the methodology and prove the reliability of the methodology and conclusion. This mostly applies to the toxic torts. This rule is identical to the Daubert standard and that is the reason it has been widely used.

As stated earlier there are cases that have given an exemption to this standard. The Supreme Court states that cases concerning plaintiffs bearing the responsibility of confirming medical causality, have evidence that has not been confirmed by the scientific community but rather compelling evidence nevertheless suggests that such relationship exists, can be taken. A good scenario can be traced in the Kemp vs. State case, where the Supreme Court gave a more relaxed ruling based on the Daubert standard (Brennan et al., 2009).

The plaintiff (Debra Kemp) claimed that the defendant issued her a rubella vaccine; she was then expectant of her daughter Delisha Kemp. The daughter acquired Congenital Rubella Syndrome. The defendant’s allegations were that the plaintiff did not confirm that she was sexually active or pregnant. Kemp argues that she was not warned that she should not have gotten the vaccination due to the repercussions it has on unborn children. The plaintiff brought their own expert to give a deposition testimony of their allegations. The defendants put up that the plaintiff did not have enough scientifically acceptable evidence to prove that the rubella immunization did in deed cause the child’s defect (Brennan et al., 2009).

The trial court and the Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendants stating that the expert did not use any methodology in order to come up with the conclusion. According to the two courts, no treatise, toxicology data, epidemiology data, medical journal, report or study was given to demonstrate an existing relationship between the Congenital Rubella Syndrome and the rubella vaccine. The expert’s opinion was not based on any scientific methodology or tests acceptable to medical practitioners. When the case was taken to the Supreme Court, the decision was revised. The court ruled that it was an error to fail to carry out an evidentiary hearing on the expert’s opinion reliability. Additionally, it was settled that the form in which of the expert’s opinion was could not be considered as admissible.

As proven, the two States apply two rules that bear both similarities and divergences. New Jersey follows the Daubert standard with some given exceptions. On the other hand, Maryland follows the 702 Rule with some exceptions that permit the Daubert standard. However, the use of scientific evidence in a manner that is generally tested and acceptable by the science community acts as the premise utilized by thirty states in the United States and New Jersey is not an exceptional. The Kemp case was ruled differently from what the Daubert standard states. This was however not the case with the Rubanick vs. State case. The Court ruled that the methodology used by the expert was not scientifically correct (Brennan et al., 2009). The Court also concluded that it was an error to fail to conduct an evidentiary hearing; despite the fact that the involved parties did not inquire for one.

As stated in the cases above, scientific evidence presented in the courts of New Jersey for the first time must be tested and acceptable by the scientific community. This is to avoid any form of masquerading or individuals practicing pseudoscience from presenting “scientific” evidences in court (Cranor, 2006). Although the Supreme Court might offered a different ruling as evidenced by the Kemp and the Rubanick cases, plaintiffs must always use the Daubert standard presenting any form of exhibit.

In conclusion, all States use the Frye standard, the Daubert standard or the 702 rules with regard to scientific examinations, with the majority employing the Daubert standard. Although it has been stated that there are exceptions to these standards, it is only important that the plaintiffs align by the given rules for case credibility. Note that, the Supreme Court might rule otherwise but the trial courts rule according to the standard governing the particular case. Additionally, the Appellate Division also aligns with the standard governing a particular State.

References

Brennan, R. F., Brown, A. S., Callo, F. F., Campion, T. F., Galpern, M. A., DiGioia, D., Green, P. P. New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education. (2009). New Jersey trial & evidence. New Brunswick, N.J: New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education.

Calhoun, M. C. (2008). Scientific Evidence in Court: Daubert or Frye, 15 Years Later. Washington Legal Foundation, 23(37):1-4.

Cranor, C. F. (2006). Toxic torts: Science, law, and the possibility of justice. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.

Rudlin, D. A., & American Bar Association. (2007). Toxic tort litigation. Chicago, IL: American Bar Association, Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources.

Wecht, C. H., & Rago, J. T. (2006). Forensic science and law: Investigative applications in criminal, civil, and family justice. Boca Raton, FL: CRC/Taylor & Francis.

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