Shipboard Incident
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It is a well-documented fact; MSC Sonia is the container ship, which operates on the linear service between Australian East coast and Asia, Brisbane and Sydney. MSC Sonia was built by Mitsubishi industries in 1972. In essence, the ship has 261 m overall length, 32.26M the molded breadth and 21.49 depth. According to Australian transport Safety Bureau 2007, the occurrence of the ship been severely burnt by the stream was due to lack of job safety, communication and hazard awareness. Additionally, investigation outlined that, the exhaustion of the boiler safety on, which it was placed indicated that, personnel in the funnel casing were vulnerable at the time that the boiler safety valve maneuvered. With this regard, this paper seeks to analyze the report of the crew member that seriously burned by steam on the board of MSC Sonia.
According to Australian transport Safety Bureau 2007, the tragedy occurred on 10 April, at around 9.45 am. With no doubt; the incident was so much traumatism that, the ship carried the normal cargo exchanges thus, the degree of the consequences of the damage being high. In conjunction with this, the ship captain joined the ship whose plan was to complete the audit of the ship management through carrying out inspection. In facts, the crew carried out their normal maintenance duties and normal watch keeping. With this in mind, investigations were done to establish the cause of the tragedy, and results indicated that, while the ordinary seaman with the boatswain were painting the starboard of the main engine exhaust, the steam unexpectedly uttered the boiler safety valve. Surprisingly, the chief engineer, the surveyor and the second engineer knew that the steam would exhaust in the funnel top vent but; they assumed that no tragedy would occur in that, the incidence would be clear for all personnel. In this regard, Australian transport Safety Bureau argues that, if each group knew activities to be carried out in tragedy, the incident would not have occurred. In facts, all members had the seagoing experience but their ignorance for the incidence caused the ship tragedy.
In essence, at the time of incidence, the MSC Sonia ship had one Myanmar crew with thirty Indian nationals. It is a well-documented fact; the master held an Indian certificate of skill with seventeen years of seagoing experience in addition, was sailing as the master for six years. In conjunction with this, the chief engineer held a class one certificate of competency in Indian in addition, has thirty two years of seagoing working experience in the sense that, he had been a chief engineer from 1990. Additionally, the chief mate held the Indian first mate certificate with eighteen years of the seagoing experience. The seagoing engineer on the other hand, had twenty three of the seagoing experience. Despite the experiences and education background the mentioned people had, they were not aware of the dangers associated while working in the platform of the conduit casing. In this regard, the chief engineers, surveyor with the second engineer were not equipped that, the crew was working in the top platform of funnel casing. Secondly, there were no safety issues in the sense that, the engineer officer and the senior deck never discussed their work programs adequately to enhance awareness of each department responsibilities. In conjunction with this, the ship crew never considered risks associated with painting of the funnel top exhaust or inspecting the boiler. With no doubt; the direction through, which the placement of steam vent pipe was exhausted outlined that, any individual in the funnel top platform was vulnerable for the tragedy. Subsequently, surveyor neglected to control the risks linked to the operating safety valves.
Investigations done by Australian transport Safety Bureau indicated that, the vent pipe construction attributed to the incidence occurrence in the sense that, it never directed the exhausting steam at the height above the working platform. It is borne in mind; the vent pipe stands at 0.5 M above the deck whereby it is terminated with the right angle bend, and the steam is directed towards the main working platform areas. With this regard, report outline that, there would no injuries of the ordinary seaman had the pipe been designed directing the steam away from the height above the person standing the platform.
In reality, the ship security management system demanded a permit for the working system but, never included the necessities for the ship crew to carry out the hazardous tasks. With this regard, the chief engineer and the chief mate never identified some hazards that demanded attention in the sense that, they carried their normal duties. In this context, if the chief mate with the chief engineer completed their tasks, it is argued that, they would have identified the hazard of venting of steam. Despite the surveyor been aware that the steam would exhaust the top funnel; he assumed that the ship crew would ensure the area was clear of the personnel. Subsequently, he never checked the strategies that would have controlled the risks. With this in mind, Australian transport Safety Bureau outline that, if the surveyor controlled the hazards associated with the safety valves, he would have controlled the risk.
In facts, the MSC Sonia protection management demanded the senior staff to discuss the maintenance completed in two weeks and forwarded to the ship’s manager like the maintenance report. Nevertheless, the protection management had not outlined the need of carrying out daily meetings, which as a result, the ship crew never identified the need for implementing the system. Typically, the chief mate discussed the maintenance issue with the engineers in cases when he felt the need for addressing the technical input. In this regard, if the engineer officer and the senior deck met occasionally to discuss the intended work to complete; they would probably identify the hazards and fix it. Nevertheless, this was not the case in that, the steam exhausted from the boiler safety valves when crew members were working with the funnel exterior top platform.
In conclusion, the Australian transport Safety Bureau outline that, the MSC ship management introduced some safety actions to prevent such incidence occurring. In essence, the company issued numerous safety circulars that emphasized on effective communication, job planning and analysis. In conjunction with this, job planning system demanded the toolbox meeting and completion of the risk assessment before any work started. With this regard, the company intends to prevent the incident occurrence by working on areas that require improvement and change. In this regard, this paper has analyzed the report of the crew member that seriously burned by steam on the board of MSC Sonia.
References
Australian Transport Safety Investigation Report. (1987).Crew member seriously burned by steam on board MSC Sonia. Marine Occurrence Investigation, 239 1-7
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